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Abstract—Millimeter wave (mmWave) vehicular communica-
tion systems have the potential to improve traffic efficiency and
safety. Lack of secure communication links, however, may lead to
a formidable set of abuses and attacks. To secure communication
links, a physical layer precoding technique for mmWave vehicular
communication systems is proposed in this paper. The proposed
technique exploits the large dimensional antenna arrays available
at mmWave systems to produce direction dependent transmission.
This results in coherent transmission to the legitimate receiver
and artificial noise that jams eavesdroppers with sensitive
receivers. Theoretical and numerical results demonstrate the
validity and effectiveness of the proposed technique and show that
the proposed technique provides high secrecy throughput when
compared to conventional array and switched array transmission
techniques.
Index Terms—Millimeter-wave, PHY security, beamforming,
V2X.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) will rely
on vehicular communication technologies to enable a variety
of applications for safety, traffic efficiency, driver assistance,
and infotainment [1], [2]. The abundance of bandwidth in
the millimeter wave (mmWave) will enable higher data rate
communication between vehicles to exchange the raw data
from LIDAR, radar, and other sensors to support advanced
driver-assisted and safety-related functionalities.
Like regular communication systems, vehicular communi-
cation systems are prone to a set of abuses and attacks that
could jeopardize the efficiency of transportation systems and
the physical safety of vehicles and drivers. Security threats and
attacks in vehicular environments have been described in detail
in [2]-[6]. To preserve the privacy and security of vehicular
communication networks, higher-layer encryption techniques
have been proposed in [6]-[8], and references therein. These
techniques, however, are based on digital signature methods
that require vehicles to store large number of encryption
keys. These keys must also be regularly exchanged, hence
creating, in addition to the processing overhead, an additional
communication overhead [1], [2]. With the emergence of new
time-sensitive ITS applications and the increasing size of the
decentralized vehicular network, the implementation of these
higher-layer techniques becomes complex and challenging.
Additionally these techniques fail to secure communication
links if the encryption keys are compromised, and/or key
distribution becomes difficult.
To mitigate these challenges, keyless physical layer (PHY)
security techniques [9]-[20], which do not directly rely on
upper-layer data encryption or secret keys, can be employed
to secure vehicular communication links. These techniques are
based on the use of one or more of the following approaches:
(i) directional beamforming [10]-[13], (ii) distributed arrays
(or nodes) [14] [15], (iii) dual-beam techniques [16], and (iv)
switched arrays [17]-[20]. In all of these techniques, the trans-
mitter uses multiple antennas to create interference or artificial
noise within the null space of the receiver. Such interference
will degrade the channel of potential eavesdroppers and will
not impact the receiver’s channel.
Despite their effectiveness, the techniques in [10]-[16]
require fully digital baseband precoding, which is difficult
to realize in mmWave vehicular systems. This is due to
the limited number of available RF chains and additional
hardware and power constraints in mmWave systems [21] [22].
While it might be justifiable to deploy large number of RF
chains in cellular base stations with relaxed power constraints,
this leverage might not be possible in vehicular transmitters.
Due to both power and hardware constraints, switched array
techniques [17]-[20] might be suitable for vehicular mmWave
systems with large number of antennas. These techniques use
antenna switches to associate a subset of antennas with every
transmission symbol. This results in coherent transmission
towards the receiver and induces artificial noise in all other
directions. Nonetheless, it was recently shown that switched
array security techniques can be breached by exploiting the
sparsity in the transmit antenna array [23] [24].
In this paper, we propose a new PHY security technique for
vehicular communications that does not require the exchange
of keys between vehicles. We assume a single transmitter
communicating with a single receiver in the presence of an
eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1. The proposed technique
uses an antenna architecture with a single RF chain (in-
stead of multiple RF chains), and performs analog precoding
with antenna selection. To transmit an information symbol,
a random set (called a subset) of antennas are co-phased
to transmit the information symbol to the receiver, while
the remaining antennas are used to randomize the far field
radiation pattern at non-receiver directions. This results in
coherent transmission to the receiver and a noise-like signal
that jams potential eavesdroppers with sensitive receivers. Note
that the proposed technique is robust to plaintext attacks and
2Fig. 1: Vehicle to vehicle communication with a possible
eavesdropper. The transmitting vehicle is communicating with
a target vehicle while the eavesdropper tries to intercept the
transmitted data.
other attacks highlighted in [23] and [24] since a random
subset is associated with every data symbol, and all antennas
are used for data transmission, i.e. the array is no longer sparse.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a mmWave system with a transmitting vehicle
(transmitter) and a receiving vehicle (receiver) in the presence
of a single or multiple eavesdroppers as shown in Fig. 1. The
transmitter is equipped with NT transmit antennas and a single
RF chain as shown in Fig. 2. The receiver is equipped with NR
antennas. We adopt a uniform linear array (ULA) with isotopic
antennas along the x-axis with the array centered at the origin;
nonetheless, the proposed technique can be adapted to arbitrary
antenna structures. Since the array is located along the x-y
plane, the receiver’s location is specified by the azimuth angle
of arrival/departure (AoA/AoD). The transmitter is assumed
to know the angular location of the target receiver but not of
the potential eavesdroppers.
The transmit data symbol s(k) ∈ C, where E[|s(k)|2] = 1
and k is the symbol index, is multiplied by a unit norm
transmit beamforming vector f = [f1 f2 ... fNT ] ∈ CNT
with fn denoting the complex weight on transmit antenna
n. At the receiver, the received signals on all antennas are
combined with a unit norm receive combining vector w =
[w1 w2 ... wNR ] ∈ CNR . Assuming a narrow band line-of-
sight (LOS) channel with perfect synchronization, the received
signal can be written as
y(k, φ, θ) =
√
Pαw∗H(φ, θ)fs(k) + z(k), (1)
where φ is AoA at the receiver and θ is AoD from the
transmitter, P is the transmission power and α is the path-
loss. In (1), H is the NR ×NT channel matrix that represents
the mmWave channel between the transmitter and the receiver,
and z(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the additive noise.
Due to the dominant reflected path from the road surface, a
two-ray model is usually adopted in the literature to model
LOS vehicle-to-vehicle communication [26]-[28]. Based on
this model, the channel H can be modeled using array mani-
fold concepts as H = gar(φ)a∗t (θ), where g = 1√2 (1+re
jΦ),
r = −1 is the reflection coefficient of the road, and Φ is the
angle between the direct and the reflected path and it is given
by Φ = 2piλ
2hthr
D [28]. The variables ht, hr represent the height
of the transmitting and receiving antennas respectively, D is
Fig. 2: Array architecture with NT antennas and a single RF
chain.
the distance between the vehicles, and λ is the wavelength.
Since hthr ≪ D, which is typical in vehicular environments,
the angle Φ is small and both the LOS and non-LOS paths
combine at the azimuth AoA φ. The vector ar(φ) represents
the receiver’s array manifold corresponding to the AoA φ and
the vector at(θ) represents the transmitter’s array manifold
corresponding to the AoD θ. For simplicity, the receiver’s
beam is assumed to be aligned to towards the transmitter for
maximum reception i.e. w = ar(φ). Hence, the received signal
along an angle θ becomes
y(k, θ) =
√
Pαa∗r (φ)H(φ, θ)fs(k) + z(k) (2)
=
√
PαNRh
∗(θ)fs(k) + z(k), (3)
where NR is the array gain at the receiver. For a ULA
with d ≤ λ2 antenna spacing, the channel for a receiver
located along the θ direction can be written as h∗(θ) =
g[e−j(
N−1
2 )
2pid
λ
cos θ e−j(
N−1
2 −1) 2pidλ cos θ
... ej(
N−1
2 )
2pid
λ
cos θ] [29].
III. MILLIMETER WAVE SECURE TRANSMISSION
In this section, we introduce a novel analog PHY security
technique that randomizes the data stream at the eavesdropper
without the need for a fully digital array or antenna switches
as done in [11]-[20]. Instead of using all antennas for beam-
forming, a set of random antennas are used for coherent beam-
forming, while the remaining antennas are set to destructively
combine at the receiver. The indices of these antennas are
randomized in every symbol transmission. This randomizes
the beam pattern sidelobes and as a result, produces noise-like
signals at non-receiver directions. Although the target receiver
would observe a fixed gain reduction (due to destructive
combining), malicious eavesdroppers will observe a noise-like
interference.
Let IM (k) be a random subset of M antennas used to
transmit the kth symbol, IL(k) be a subset that contains the
indices of the remaining antennas, EL(k) be a subset that
contains the even entries of IL(k), and OL(k) be a subset
that contains the odd entries of IL(k). The progressive inter-
antenna phase shifts are set as
Υn(k) =


Ψn(k), n ∈ IM (k)
Ψn(k), n ∈ EL(k)
−j log(−ejΨn(k)), n ∈ OL(k)
(4)
where Ψn(k) =
(
N−1
2 − n
)
2pi dλ cos(θR), and θR is the
transmit direction towards the legitimate receiver. Note in (4)
ej(−j log(−e
jΨn(k))) = −ejΨn(k), and the nth entry of the
3beamforming vector f(k) is fn(k) = 1√NT e
jΥn(k)
. Using (3)
and (4), the received signal at the receiver along θR becomes
yR(k, θR) =
√
PαNR
NT
gRs(k)×( ∑
m∈IM(k)
e−j(
N−1
2 −m) 2pidλ cos θRej(
N−1
2 −m) 2pidλ cos θR+
∑
n∈EL(k)
e−j(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos θRej(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos θR−
∑
n∈OL(k)
e−j(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos θRej(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos θR
)
+ z(k),
(5)
where gR is the channel gain at the receiver, NR is the
receiver’s array gain, and NT is a power normalization term.
Grouping similar terms in (5) we obtain
yR(k, θR) = s(k)gR
√
PαNR
NT
×( ∑
m∈IM (k)
ej(
N−1
2 −m) 2pidλ (cos θR−cos θR)
+
∑
n∈EL(k)
ej(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ (cos θR−cos θR)
−
∑
n∈OL(k)
ej(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ (cos θR−cos θR)
)
+ z(k)
= s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
gR
√
Pα︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective channel
gain
M
√
NR
NT︸ ︷︷ ︸
array gain
+ z(k)︸︷︷︸
additive
noise
.
(6)
Similarly, the received signal at the eavesdropper can be
written as
yE(k, θE) =
√
PαENE
NT
gEs(k)×( ∑
m∈IM(k)
e−j(
N−1
2 −m) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2 −m) 2pidλ cos θR+
∑
n∈EL(k)
e−j(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos θR−
∑
n∈EL(k)
e−j(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos θR
)
+zE(k)
= s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
gE
√
PαE︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective channel
gain
√
NEβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
artifical
noise
+ zE(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
additive
noise
,
(7)
where αE and gE are the path loss and the channel gain at
the eavesdropper, NE is the eavesdropper’s array gain, and
zE ∼ CN (0, σ2E) is the additive noise at the eavesdropper. The
term β in (7) is
β =
√
1
NT
( ∑
m∈IM(k)
ej(
N−1
2 −m) 2pidλ (cos θR−cos θE) +
∑
n∈EL(k)
ej(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos(θR−θE) −
∑
n∈OL(k)
ej(
N−1
2 −n) 2pidλ cos(θR−θE)
)
. (8)
Since the entries of IM (k) and IL(k) are randomly selected
for each data symbol, (8) can be simplified to
β =
√
1
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
Wne
j(N−12 −n) 2pidλ (cos θR−cos θE), (9)
where Wn is a Bernoulli random variable and Wn = 1 with
probability (M + (NT −M)/2)/NT = NT+M2NT , and Wn = −1
with probability NT−M2NT .
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
mmWave secure transmission technique. As shown in (7), the
received signal at an arbitrary eavesdropper is subject to both
multiplication and additive noise. This makes the derivation of
a simple closed form expression for the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) and a secrecy rate formula challenging, if not possible.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed mmWave secure
transmission technique, we define the the secrecy throughput
R (bits per channel use) as
R = [log2(1 + γR)− log2(1 + γE)]+, (10)
where γR is the SNR at the target receiver, γE is the SNR at
the eavesdropper, and a+ denotes max{0, a}. From (3) and
(6), the SNR at the receiver can be expressed as
γR =
PαNR(E[h
∗(θR)f(k)])2
PαNRvar[h∗(θR)f(k)] + σ2
(11)
=
PαNRM
2g2R
NTσ2
=
2PαNRM
2 sin2(ΦR/2)
NTσ2
, (12)
where (12) follows since the array gain is constant at the target
receiver and g2R = 12 (1−e−jΦR)(1−ejΦR) = (1− cos(ΦR)) =
2 sin2(ΦR/2), and ΦR is the phase angle between the receiver’s
direct and the reflected path.
Similarly, the SNR at an eavesdropper can be expressed as
γE =
PαENE(E[h
∗(θE)f(k)])2
PαENEvar[h∗(θE)f(k)] + σ2E
(13)
=
PαENEg
2
E(E[β])
2
PαENEg2Evar[β] + σ
2
E
, (14)
where g2E = 2 sin
2(ΦE/2), and ΦE is the phase angle between
the eavesdropper’s direct and the reflected path. To derive
γE, we need to characterize the random variable β in (9).
Note that the random variable β is a sum of complex random
variable. Invoking the central limit theorem, the artificial noise
term β can be approximated by a complex Gaussian random
variable for sufficiently large NT, and, it can be completely
characterized by its mean and variance. To complete the SNR
derivation, we introduce the following lemma
Lemma 1: For large number of antennas NT and θR 6= θE,
E[β] =
M
NT
√
NT
sin
(
NT
pid
λ (cos θR − cos θE)
)
sin
(
pid
λ (cos θR − cos θE)
) , (15)
and
var[β] ≈ N
2
T −M2
N2T
. (16)
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(a) NT = 32
 
 
Proposed (simulation)
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Fig. 3: Numerical and theoretical (eq. (18)) values of the se-
crecy throughput versus the eavesdropper’s angular direction;
(a) NT = 32 and M = 24, (b) NT = 16 and M = 12.
Proof: The proof can be found in [30] and is omitted for
space limitation.
Using (15) and (16) γE in (14) becomes
γE ≈ 1N2T−M2
N2T
+
σ2E
2PαENE sin2(ΦE/2)
×
(
M2
N3T
sin2
(
NT
pid
λ (cos θR − cos θE)
)
sin2
(
pid
λ (cos θR − cos θE)
)
)
, (17)
where the approximation arises from (16).
Substituting (12) and (17) in (10), we obtain
R ≈
[
log2
(
1 +
2PαNRM
2 sin2(ΦR/2)
NTσ2
)
−
log2
(
1 +
1
N2T−M2
N2T
+
σ2E
2PαENE sin2(ΦE/2)
×
(
M2
N3T
sin2
(
NT
pid
λ (cos θR − cos θE)
)
sin2
(
pid
λ (cos θR − cos θE)
)
))]+
. (18)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we consider vehicle-to-vehicle transmission
and study the performance of the proposed security technique
in the presence of an eavesdropper. For comparison, we
simulate and plot the secrecy throughput of conventional array
(without PHY security) and switched array [20] transmission
techniques. Unless otherwise specified, the number of antennas
at the transmitter is NT = 32, |gR|2NR = 8, and |gE|2NE = 32.
The system operates at 60 GHz with a bandwidth of 50 MHz
and an average transmit power of 37 dBm. The distance from
the transmitter to the receiver is 30 meters, the distance from
the transmitter to the eavesdropper is 10 meters, and the path
loss exponent is fixed to 2.
In Fig. 3, we plot the secrecy throughput achieved by
the proposed technique versus the eavesdropper’s angular
location when using 32 and 16 transmit antennas. We also
plot the secrecy throughput achieved by conventional array and
switched transmission methods. In Figs. 3(a) and (b), we show
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(a) Secrecy Throughput
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Numerical
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Switched arrays
Fig. 4: (a) Numerical and theoretical (eq. (18)) values of the
secrecy throughput versus the transmission subset size M ;
NT = 32, θR = 100
◦
, and θE = 95◦. (b) Beam variance
at θE = 50◦ and θE = 95◦ (superimposed).
that the secrecy throughput of the proposed technique is high
at all angular locations except at the target receiver’s angular
location (θR = 100 degrees). We also show that switched
array techniques provide comparable secrecy throughput with
the proposed technique, while conventional array techniques
provide poor secrecy throughputs, especially for lower number
of transmit antennas as shown in Fig. 3(b). The reason for
this is that conventional array transmission techniques result
in a constant radiation pattern at the eavesdropper while, the
proposed and the switched array techniques randomize the
radiation pattern at an eavesdropper, thereby creating artificial
noise. For the proposed and switched array transmission tech-
niques, no randomness is experienced at the target receiver,
and the secrecy throughput is minimum when the eavesdropper
is located in the same angle with the target receiver, which
is generally not the case in practice. We also observe that
the proposed technique performs better than switched array
techniques especially when the eavesdropper is closely located
to the legitimate receiver, which is typically the worst case
scenario.
In Figs. 4(a) and (b) we examine the impact of the
transmission subset size M on the secrecy throughput and
the generated beam pattern variance (or artificial noise). In
Fig. 4(a), we observe that as the subset size M increases,
the secrecy throughput of the proposed technique increases,
plateaus, and then decreases. The reason for this is that as M
increases, more antennas are co-phased for data transmission.
On one hand, this increases the beamforming gain at the
target receiver. On the other hand, increasing M decreases
the variance of the artificial noise at the eavesdropper as
shown in Fig. 4(b). Therefore, there is a trade-off between
the beamforming gain at the receiver and the artificial noise at
a potential eavesdropper, and there exists the optimum value
of M that maximizes the secrecy throughput. In Figs. 4(a) and
(b), we also show that the proposed technique provides higher
secrecy throughput and beam pattern variance (or artificial
5noise) when compared to the switched array technique without
the need for additional antenna switches as required by the
switched array technique. In the switched array technique, only
M antennas are used to generate the artificial noise, while the
remaining NT−M antennas are idle. The proposed technique
uses NT −M antennas to generate artificial noise at potential
eavesdroppers, and hence, results in higher secrecy throughput
and artificial noise. In addition to reducing the beam pattern
variance at a potential eavesdropper, the idle antennas create
a sparse array which could be exploited to launch attacks on
switched array techniques. Since the proposed technique uses
all antennas, it is difficult to breach. Finally, in Fig. 4(a),
we show that the theoretical approximation of the secrecy
throughput is tight when compared to the secrecy throughput
achieved by Monte Carlo simulation results. This enables us
to gain further insights into the impact of key parameters such
as, the subset size M and number of transmit/receive antennas,
on the system performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a PHY layer security technique
for secure mmWave vehicular communication. The proposed
technique takes advantage of the large antenna arrays at the
mmWave frequencies to jam eavesdroppers with sensitive
receivers. This enhances the security of the communication
link between a transmitter and a legitimate receiver. The pro-
posed technique is shown to provide high secrecy throughput
when compared to conventional and switched array techniques
without the need for encryption/decryption keys and additional
communication and processing overhead at the target receiver.
This makes the proposed security technique favorable for time-
critical road safety applications and vehicular communications
in general.
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